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BOOK REVIEW
Towards a Post-Apartheid Future: Political & Economic Relations in
Southern Africa, Gavin Maasdorp and Alan Whiteside, editors, New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.

G. Marcus Cole*

Towards a Post-ApartheidFuture may be the most unique effort in
the history of constitution-drafting, presenting the people of South Africa
an opportunity perhaps never before afforded an emerging nation. The
book is the culmination of a project undertaken by the Economic Research Unit at the University of Natal. The purpose of the conference at
which the component papers were presented was to examine the likely
business and political environment to emerge in the region from the rubble of apartheid. The result is an insightful and timely font of raw material to fuel the formation of a new government in South Africa, and new
relationships throughout the region and the world.
Alan Whiteside and Gavin Maasdorp have compiled what is possibly the most significant basis for understanding the political and economic context for constitutional change in Southern Africa since Walter
William's seminal work, South Africa's War Against Capitalism.' It must
be stressed here that Towards a Post-ApartheidFuture is primarily concerned with the political and economic relationships throughout the region of Southern Africa. Nevertheless, the aspiration of this review is to
evaluate the potential significance of this project as a source of social
scientific data and analysis for the crafting of a constitution upon which
new legal and commercial relationships might be based. Accordingly,
the substance of each individual contribution is discussed with an eye
toward its import for the birth of new political structures. Next, the project as a whole is distilled to a common theme. Finally, this observation
is used as a basis for suggesting how this project might inform negotiations and deliberations over a new constitution in South Africa.
* B.S. Cornell University, 1989; J.D. Northwestern University School of Law, 1993.
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THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

OF SOUTHERN AFRICA
Whiteside and Maasdorp provide an excellent introductory chapter,
outlining the book's elements, contributors, and aspirations. They forthrightly and immediately apologize for the project's most glaring yet understandable shortcoming: the lack of timeliness in the chapters on the
political environment of change. The book grows out of a project
launched in 1988, and the contributions arose from papers presented at a
conference in 1989. While the contributors had some chance to amend
their papers after that, the sweep of events both in South Africa and the
world at large have rendered much of the political analysis obsolete.
Although many of the succeeding chapters mention President F. W.
de Klerk's earth-shaking speech before the South African Parliament on
February 2, 1990,2 it is clear that all of the papers were substantively
complete before that event. As a result, many of the previously
unimaginable events that occurred during the book's publication process
go unaddressed. This shortcoming is particularly apparent in the contributions made by the political scientists on the history and current political context of the region. These chapters simply did not wear well with
time.
The chapters on the condition of and prospects for the South African economy are timeless, however. The introduction outlines exactly
what has been attempted by the contributors in this regard. The editors
here cannot resist revealing some of the more astonishing findings of
these studies. Yet these peeks provide only a minor glimpse of what is to
come in the very readable yet informative analysis of an economy that
serves as the fulcrum of change.
Whiteside and Maasdorp give us a very complete picture of both the
goals and the achievements of this project. This chapter succeeds as a
necessary introduction to what may accurately be described as a very
accessible primer for anyone interested in gaining a grasp on present and
prospective economic and political conditions in the region.
A.

The Political Landscape

Unlike much of the other political discussion in the book, Robert
2 In his speech to open Parliament on February 2, 1990, President F. W. de Klerk announced
the removal of the ban on the African National Congress (ANC), the South African Communist
Party (SACP), and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and also declared that his government was
firmly committed to pursuing negotiations with the leaders of majority groups. Robert Schrire,
White Politicsand Strategies in the 1990's, in TOWARDS A POST-APARTHEID FUTRURE 10 (Gavin
Maasdorp and Alan Whiteside eds., 1992).
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Schrire's contribution, "White Politics and Strategies in the 1990's,"'3 is
primarily historical, and as a result, unshaken by the passage of time.
This historical perspective should not, however, lull anyone with even
the most extensive familiarity with South African politics into skipping
this piece. Schrire's analysis can only be described as "surprising," and
simply should not be overlooked.
Schrire outlines the forces that came together to paint White South
Africa into its current comer. First he describes the recent historical
developments leading up to the crisis within the White political machinery. Next, he explains the ascension of F. W. de Klerk, and the political
landscape he inherited. Schrire then lays bare the cold political logic
behind de Klerk's decision to move toward negotiations with representatives of the majority population. Finally, he provides a now obsolete
analysis of how the negotiations might have taken shape.
Schrire asserts that apartheid could remain viable only so long as
four conditions existed: (1) international indifference with respect to
South Africa's domestic structure, (2) a growth oriented domestic economy, (3) the acquiescence of Black South Africans to White rule and
policies, and (4) a united and cohesive White minority. He further asserts that all four elements of this artificial imbalance unravelled under
President P. W. Botha. Revolts by Blacks erupted nation-wide. These
were met with declarations of states of emergency, which led simultaneously to a loss of confidence by major Western banks and other business
concerns, as well as international scrutiny. The combination of political
instability and global sanctions weakened the economy drastically.
These developments led to a disintegration of the final condition necessary for the maintenance of apartheid: White cohesiveness.
The splintering White minority was suddenly confronted by another
stunning development when Botha resigned as National Party (NP)
leader in February 1989, following a stroke. F. W. de Klerk emerged
from very hotly contested caucuses as his party's leader, and after a
lengthy power struggle, he forced Botha out of government. Flight to
the Conservative and Democratic Parties (CP and DP, respectively) was
enough to reduce the NP to a minority of white support for the first time
in thirty years, but was not enough to deny de Klerk control of the reigns
of government. But the political winds led him to two very painful conclusions: (1) that a "business as usual" or even an "incremental change"
approach would cause the NP to lose panicked White voters to both the
far right CP and the liberal DP; and (2) that the "big leap forward" was
the only way the NP could stay in control of a society confronted by
3 Id.
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changes which were inevitable. According to Schrire's interpretation of
the election results, de Klerk's decision to pursue negotiations with representatives of the Black majority was simply a logical extension of the
NP's desire to remain atop the White minority political machinery. This
startling conclusion renders Schrire's discussion about possible negotiation formats as anticlimactic as it is outdated.
Paulus Zulu's contribution, "The Extra-Parliamentary Opposition
in South Africa," 4 outlines the source of power of the Black masses in the
changing political environment of South Africa. Zulu compiles a glossary
of the organizations that spearheaded the extra-parliamentary opposition
during the period through which Black political organizations were
banned. Zulu's explanation of the various positions held and roles
played by the various organizations is both concise and informative.
However, he treats these organizations as some neatly orchestrated concert, in complete contravention of the descriptions he himself provides.
While Zulu recognizes the significance of the opposition in the events
leading up to the current negotiations, he sees the extra-parliamentary
opposition as having outlived its purpose. As a result, Zulu argues that
its constituent groups should be disbanded.5
What Zulu fails to recognize in his own description is that the extraparliamentary opposition can be characterized as a spontaneous order
which developed from the political environment created by the White
minority government. This order filled an artificial vacuum. As the need
arose, so did the extra-governmental bodies to address that need. These
organizations are likely to continue to thrive, Zulu's recommendation
notwithstanding, as long as the demand for outlets of political expression
persists. Banning political activity among an oppressed people appears
to have been analogous to banning drugs in most western democracies;
laws do not stem supply and demand, they merely alter the routes by
which they find each other.
Unlike many of the other political observers contributing to this collection, Zulu's analysis has not suffered obsolescence with the sweep of
events in South Africa. While this piece does not dwell extensively on
the prospects for the future, it provides a foundation necessary for any
understanding of the roots of the power that threatened any hope the
White minority might have held of maintaining the apparatus of
apartheid.
Hasu Patel, in "The SADCC States, the International Environment
4 Paulus Zulu, The Extra-ParliamentaryOpposition in South Africa, in TOWARDS A POSTAPARTHEID FUTURE 29 (Gavin Maasdorp and Alan Whiteside eds., 1992).
5 Id. at 43.
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and Change in South Africa," 6 provides a succinct blotter on the important political developments in the neighboring states of the region. This
entry furnishes the reader with a cursory understanding of the regional
context in which the changes within South Africa occur. Patel takes
each neighbor, state by state, and details the recent history of both the
respective relationships with South Africa, and the domestic events
which impacted these relations.
While Patel masterfully constructs the framework necessary for a
full understanding of the circumstances in South Africa, his piece suffers,
more than any other in this collection, from the rapid pace of events
which occurred during the publication of this book. Surprisingly, it is
the analysis and not the report of the climate that has been left behind by
the sweep of time. The respective national reports bring us only up to the
dramatic de Klerk speech of February 1990. However, it is the earlier
events that appear to be of most significance anyway. What is troubling
about Patel's analysis is how wide of the mark it has proven to be with
the hindsight afforded by the lag in publication. He appears to find it
impossible to envision any resolution to the conflict within South Africa
without the direct involvement of the United States and the Soviet
Union. While there may have been strong support at the time for the
idea that such intervention might be necessary, it appears that Patel had
taken it to be a foregone conclusion.
This shortcoming, however, should not overshadow the fact that
Patel provides a concise yet complete outline of key political developments in the region over recent decades. In fact, it is unlikely that a
comparable treatment of the region's history could be found anywhere
else. This aspect of Patel's contribution provides important and necessary background information for the rest of the book.
B.

The Economics of Race

Ronald Bethlehem's contribution must be considered the cornerstone of this collection. In "Economic Development in South Africa,"7
Bethlehem spells out precisely the extent of the degradation of the South
African economy over the last few decades, with statistical simplicity. It
becomes unmistakably clear upon reading this chapter that the driving
6 Hasu H. Patel, The SADCC States, The InternationalEnvironment and Change in South Africa, in TOWARDS A POST-APARTHEID FUTURE 45 (Gavin Maasdorp and Alan Whiteside eds.,
1992). The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC, commonly pronounced "sadec") is an economic cooperation association made up of Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania, Angola and Namibia. Id.
7 Ronald Bethlehem, Economic Development in South Africa, in TOWARDS A POST-APARTHEID
FUTURE 62 (Gavin Maasdorp and Alan Whiteside eds., 1992).
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force behind change in South Africa has been the near "free fall" decline
in economic growth accompanying the efforts to buttress apartheid.
While growth has been marginally positive, Bethlehem demonstrates that
this was "more in spite of apartheid than because of it."8
He characterizes the necessary policy goals of any future government as diametrically opposed. He asserts up front that South Africa has
two principle long-term needs: job creation and competitiveness in export
markets.9 Domestically, a population growth rate of 2.5 percent (2.9
percent among Blacks) has created pressure for job creation.10 However,
he also asserts that any government to emerge from the current conflict
must also be concerned with the maintenance of South Africa's competitiveness in the export markets in which it participates. This goal, he
maintains, requires capital-intensive investment, which he finds to be
generally inconsistent with job creation or labor intensive investment.
Bethlehem spends much of the remainder of his piece describing the
current state of the South African economy. First, he details the structure of the economy, with agriculture and mining accounting for 11 percent and 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) respectively.1"
Perhaps the most surprising statistic here is that exports account for 55
percent of the country's production. 2 This dependence on exports, he
contends, situates South Africa uniquely in the dubious position of being
ultra sensitive to fluctuations in the world economy.
Next, Bethlehem asserts, without further explanation, that the government's efforts to reduce the wage gap between Whites and Blacks and
to accommodate union demands have ironically led to completely unintended results. In fact, such policies have resulted in "the relative cheapening of capital and, thus, also to an aggravation of unemployment."1 3
Third, he starkly represents the disparities in wealth and income distribution, in part through the use of "the Gini coefficient."1.4 "The Gini coefficient measures income inequality on a scale from naught to one,
independent of population size or average income level."1 5 Bethlehem
contrasts South Africa's Gini coefficient of 0.68 with coefficients in Western industrialized countries of between 0.35-0.41 and in "semi-industrialized countries" of between 0.50-0.60.16 Alternatively, 5 percent of the
8 Id. at 64.
9 Id. at 62.
10 Id..

11 Id. at 64.
12 Id. at 63.
13 Id. at 69.
14 Id.
15 Id.

16 Id.
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population owned 88 percent of the wealth in 1975."7
Bethlehem finds these statistics important for two reasons. First, he
points out the reduced pool for entrepreneurial participation. Second,
and perhaps more significantly, the political ramifications are large.
Bethlehem sees the disparity in income as the key factor fueling the push
toward redistributive approaches to state reform. But he cautions
against such approaches, noting the devastating impact such a move
would have on any economy, including the threats to capital retention
and productivity.1 8 Bethlehem importunes business leaders and stakeholders to address factors impacting income disparity in order to avert
the political pressures for state-sponsored redistribution.
From here the picture only gets worse. Bethlehem unveils an economy characterized by a surplus of unskilled workers for skilled positions
which go begging, and a stifling concentration of industry. Financial
sanctions imposed in 1984 stemmed the steady flow of much needed imported savings. Then the dam burst. Capital flight in the 1980's resulted
in a net capital outflow almost three times the real net capital inflow for
each of the three preceding decades.' 9 Bethlehem characterizes this development as "the single most serious threat posed to the future development of the country.""0
Bethlehem employs this gloomy foundation to outline the political
possibilities confronting interested decision makers. He correctly characterizes the role of the state in the economy as the central issue beyond the
establishment of popular sovereignty, and identifies four possible functions of government: (1) social regulator, (2) producer, (3) entrepreneur,
and (4) "macroeconomic stabilizer."2 1 The varying degrees to which
these functions are pursued is the backbone of the ideological struggle
underlying the transfer of power. The ruling National Party, as well as
the socialists that are well represented in the Black opposition, advocate
extensive state involvement in the economy. This coincidence was at the
heart of Walter Williams' expose, mentioned earlier.22 Liberals, on the
other hand, hope to limit the size and involvement of the state in the
market. This ideological struggle has been complicated by the recent
worldwide disillusionment with state intervention.
At this point Bethlehem points to the most threatening possibility
confronting decision makers in South Africa. This is the fact that many
17 Id.
18 Id. at 70.

19 Id. at 72.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 74.
22 See WILLIAMS, supra note 1.
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of the proponents of popular sovereignty view moves toward privatization and deregulation as mechanisms by which the White minority can
maintain control of economic power. Privatization is viewed as a veiled
transfer of wealth from the public sector where White control has become untenable, to a private sphere where majority political forces might
find their reach limited. Deregulation is viewed as a means by which the
White minority might wield its amassed economic clout to fend off historically handicapped Blacks.
While Bethlehem acknowledges both the legitimacy and reasonableness of these fears, he sends a caution to those decision makers who
might use these concerns as a basis for maintaining or even increasing the
role of a post-apartheid state. Even the more doctrinaire socialist governments of the world have come face to face, he argues, with the shortcomings of central planning and its complete inability to direct complex
market forces. He admonishes the new order to not lose sight of the
benefits of free, decentralized, private markets. Prosperity need not entail continued minority control of economic factors, nor extensive government involvement.
Bethlehem concludes his contribution with a somewhat dated analysis of potential outcomes of negotiations to transfer power. He sees
South Africa's future as dependent upon which of three possible scenarios characterize the resolution of the current crisis: (1) "conflict resolved," (2) "muddling on," or (3) "mandatory sanctions. '2 3 He details
what he believes will happen to growth, employment, inflation, and the
balance of payments under each of these possibilities. The progress toward free and open elections in April 1994, however, appear to limit the
relevance of his discussion to the "conflict resolved" scenario. In any
event, Bethlehem's contribution is unquestionably the most significant
for constitution drafters, if for no other reason than his well-stated admonition against reactionary resistance to market approaches.
Raphael Kaplinsky gives a more technical analysis of the region's
economic environment in "The Manufacturing Sector and Regional
Trade in a Democratic South Africa."'2 4 Kaplinsky gives a multidimensional explanation for the decline in South Africa's growth rates. In his
view, four factors have contributed to the decay: (1) the costs of
apartheid, (2) sanctions, (3) the decline in commodity prices, and (4) the
"Dutch Disease." 25 All but the latter are self-explanatory.
23 Id. at 76.
24 Raphael Kaplinsky, The ManufacturingSector and Regional Trade in a Democratic South
Africa, in TOWARDS A POST-APARTHEID FUTURE 83 (Gavin Maasdorp and Alan Whiteside eds.,
1992).
25 Id. at 89.
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The Dutch Disease occurs when a country has a natural resource
26
with a high rent component, such as (in the case of South Africa) gold.
The effect is to raise the exchange rate to a level that is higher than would
be the case in the absence of the resource. This, in turn, makes imports
more attractive than domestic production and reduces domestic currency
receipts.2 7 The result is a decline in manufacturing, and the threat of an
inability to maintain economic growth once the natural resource is
depleted.
Kaplinsky devotes much more discussion to the possibilities for
post-apartheid industrial policy. Here, he advances the Marxist concept
of "the Enabling State,"2 and its potential for resurrecting the South
African economy. This concept represents Kaplinsky's concession that
state ownership of the factors of production probably cannot serve as a
workable alternative to private management of factors of production.
However, he sees the failure of socialized institutions around the world
as no reason to proscribe heavy involvement by an "enabling state," legitimized through such interventionism. Furthermore, he sees the high
concentration of ownership of the factors of production to be inimical to
real progress in industrial policy. Accordingly, he believes that the ownership structure of South African industry must be changed. How he
might effect this restructuring is left unanswered.
An analysis of the regional economy of Southern Africa is undertaken by Anthony M. Hawkins in "Economic Development in the
SADCC Countries." 29 Hawkins focuses his study on the membership of
the Southern African Development Coordination Conference
(SADCC). a° He finds five factors influencing policy change in the region:
(1) conservative Western donor strategies, directing aid funds towards
private sector and privatization programs; (2) the success of the Asian
rim example; (3) the increase in conditional, policy-based lending; (4) the
collapse of the ideology of the command economy around the world; and
(5) the recognition by African governments of the abject failure of their
own efforts at state planning and ownership. As a result of these factors,
all SADCC states except Botswana and Swaziland have moved to introduce market-oriented reforms.
The recent changes in economic policy among SADCC members
comes none too soon. Hawkins portrays the existing economic environ26 Id.
27 Id.

28 Id. at 94.
29 Anthony M. Hawkins, Economic Development in the SADCC Countries,in TOWARDS A POSTAPARTHEID FUTURE 105 (Gavin Maasdorp and Alan Whiteside eds., 1992).
30 Id. at 105.
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ment as very bleak. Agricultural production has declined in each of the
SADCC states throughout most of the 19801s.31 Manufacturing has
fallen as a percentage of gross domestic product over the same period.
By 1984, SADCC's share of sub-Saharan productive output has dropped
off by almost half from mid 1970's levels. 32 Mining activity, which accounts for almost all imports for three of the most important SADCC
member states, has fallen by almost half from 1976 to 1988, due in large
part to depressed international markets and the concomitant reduction in
extraction investment.3 3 Hawkins attributes much of this decline to the
heavy-handed role of SADCC governments that was in vogue over the
period.
Next, Hawkins assesses the policies that led SADCC to its current
position. The Lusaka Declaration of April 1980 focussed on four broad
objectives: (1) the reduction of economic dependence, (2) equitable regional integration, (3) efficient resource mobilization, and (4) international cooperation toward economic liberation.3 4 These well meant but
misguided goals have been all but discarded. The realities of the market
have led all of the nine SADCC members to abandon the rhetoric of
Lusaka. The idea that SADCC's "trade arrangements should not be at
the mercy of free market forces or foreign companies" 3 5 has given way to
individual member efforts to embrace both, in large part because of the
havoc resulting from the failure of central planning.
The central focus of Hawkins' analysis of a post-apartheid future is
the possibility of a broadened and deepened role for SADCC in the regional economy. By the term "broadening," Hawkins refers to the expansion of the reach of SADCC to other states in the region, as well to
other regional economic institutions. Alternatively, "deepening" refers
to increasing the level of economic coordination and cooperation. Hawkins sees deepening as the more controversial of the two concepts, and
holds little hope that SADCC will experience it in the 1990's for four
reasons: (1) members fail to see a need to cede autonomy to a central
authority; (2) members maintain a strong desire to control economic institutions; (3) deepening is technically complex, and members lack the
expertise necessary; and (4) divergent policies at various levels will frustrate attempts at coordination.
With the conviction reflecting his sympathies with the "centrists" of
the European Communities, Hawkins insists that deepening is necessary
31
32
33
34
35
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Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

108.
109.
110.
115.
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for growth in Southern Africa. He lists various policy priorities ranging
from increased domestic savings and investment, to renewed emphasis on
manpower development, to import liberalization. Additionally, he identifies key industries deserving special focus. What he fails to identify,
however, is the role federalism can play in regional economic development. Like the leading voices in the European Communities, Hawkins
appears to value central coordination over the competitive discipline exacted by a federal relationship between neighboring states. This ideology
tends to attribute all of the success of systems like that of the United
States to "open borders" rather than "open competition" for economic
activity through political and economic freedom. This bent, however,
should not overshadow the true value of Hawkins' contribution: the fact
that he documents the about-face of a group of governments from a position firmly committed to resisting market forces, to one reluctantly but
energetically recognizing and embracing them. There is a profound lesson here for the people of the new democracy emerging in South Africa.
Gavin Maasdorp follows Hawkins's analysis of SADCC with a more
generalized treatment of "Trade Relations in Southern Africa."3 6 Maasdorp explains the very existence of SADCC as a product of apartheid;
normal relations between South Africa and its neighbors has been impossible. His focus here, however, is on the value of "SADCC the regional
trading block" as a vehicle for the growth of a new South African
economy.
Maasdorp gives a very thorough explanation for the growth of regional trading blocks. He employs the Marxist concept of "regional economic hegemony," 3 7 and asserts that "macroeconomic policies and
management.., are the crucial determinants of a country's progress."38
He points to the three large trading blocks of Europe (the EC), North
America (NAFTA), and Asia (Association of South-East Asian Nations,
or ASEAN) as evidence of the wave of the future. With the transformation of the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe, Maasdorp
fears that unless Southern Africa responds with a trading union of its
own, investment resources will be diverted away from the region.
From here Maasdorp departs on an involved description of economic integration theory. He compares four levels of economic integration, from lowest to highest degree of integration: (1) a free-trade area,
(2) customs union, (3) common market, and (4) economic union. The
different forms vary on the basis of the: (a) mere elimination of internal
36 Gavin Maasdorp, Trade Relations in Southern Africa - ChangesAhead?, in TOWARDS A POSTAPARTHEID FUTURE 132 (Gavin Maasdorp and Alan Whiteside eds., 1992).
37 Id. at 133.
38 Id.

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

13:711(1993)

tariffs; (b) establishment of a common external tariff; (c) freedom of factor movement; and, finally, (d) harmony of economic policies. Maasdorp's simplified but thorough explanation of the differences makes the
concepts clear to even the most uninitiated observer.
Maasdorp then applies these concepts to the current economic
groupings in Southern Africa, and assesses the viability of each as a vehicle for regional development. The Southern African Customs Union
(SACU), which allows the duty-free movement of goods between Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS), South Africa, and Namibia, is
viewed by Maasdorp as the most promising economic grouping because
it is currently the only economic integration arrangement in Southern
Africa. SADCC is less promising because of its much looser organization focussed on facilitating cooperation in various sectors and undertakings. The Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa
(PTA) is an Organization of African Unity (OAU) initiative comprised
of eighteen countries and is designed to promote trade through reduced
trade barriers in the hopes of eventually forming a common market for
Africa. Maasdorp questions the benefit of this avenue for South African
membership since a post-apartheid South Africa would continue to recognize quality and price advantages with respect to most of its African
neighbors, and would gain little from PTA membership.
If Maasdorp's assessment suffers from anything, it is the degree to
which it reveals his attachment to the concept of economic integration.
In this fashion, his analysis reflects much of the shortsightedness concomitant with the centrist ideology championed by Hawkins only a chapter earlier. Decision makers in a post-apartheid South Africa should not,
however, be side-tracked by his unquestioned attraction to economic
groupings. Economic policy decisions will be difficult enough with the
internal complexities of the South African economy. Maasdorp's analysis, if nothing more, provides an excellent "warning label" detailing the
difficulties awaiting any attempt to restructure economic groupings in
Southern Africa.
In "Labour Flows, Refugees, AIDS and the Environment,"3 9 Alan
Whiteside contributes what may easily be considered one of the most
unique economic studies ever undertaken with respect to any region.
Whiteside gives a very technical yet readable account of the pattern of
labor movement throughout the region over the past twenty years. Over
the period, both worker movement and the percentage of female workers
39 Alan Whiteside, Labour Flows, Refugees, AIDS and the Environment, in TOWARDS A POSTAPARTHEID FUTURE 155 (Gavin Maasdorp and Alan Whiteside eds., 1992).
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moving into South Africa has dropped off by almost half." Simultaneously, the percentage of migrant labor employed in mining has increased
significantly. According to Whiteside, these trends are a result primarily
of South Africa's unemployment crisis. Workers in surrounding states
continue to seek employment in South Africa, while South Africans seek
preferential treatment with respect to the limited jobs available.
AIDS has had an interesting impact on labor flows as well. The
South African government's insistence on testing workers from Malawi
for exposure to the HIV virus caused the closing of a migrant worker
employment office there. But incidents like this are dwarfed by the fact
that the virus makes economic planning and forecasting impossible in a
region where the incidence of AIDS might reach over fifty percent of the
population.4 1 Whiteside identifies two main costs with respect to AIDS:
the direct cost of treating patients, and the indirect cost of premature
mortality. According to the World Bank, as much as 80 percent of the
cost of AIDS is of the difficult to measure indirect variety. Health care
budgets and training expenses are a few of the items that expand with the
spread of the disease. With as many as 200,000 victims by the turn of the
century, AIDS may prove to be one of the more difficult concerns of a
post-apartheid South Africa.4 2
C. The Politics of the Future
Andre du Pisani adds very little for decision makers and constitution drafters with his contribution, "South Africa and SADCC: Into the
1990's. ''43 It is exactly at the point at which du Pisani begins to focus on
the future of regional relationships that he loses focus altogether. He
agrees with Maasdorp on the difficulty of accomplishing economic integration anytime soon after a majority government takes the reigns in
South Africa, and that the recent developments in Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union mean competition for scarce development resources
from the west. His chapter, however, must be recommended for its useful
historical background, should a reader choose to wade through a short
but obvious analysis of South Africa's position with respect to SADCC.
A much more interesting contribution is found in "External Pressure for Change in South and Southern Africa,"' by Peter Vale. This
40 Id. at 156.
41 Id. at 167.
42 Id. at 171.
43 Andre du Pisani, South Africa andSADCC Into the 1990's, in TOWARDS A POST-APARTHEID
FUTURE 174 (Gavin Maasdorp and Alan Whiteside eds., 1992).
44 Peter Vale, ExternalPressurefor Changein South and Southern Africa, in TOWARDS A POSTAPARTHEID FUTURE 197 (Gavin Maasdorp and Alan Whiteside eds., 1992).
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short but compelling chapter systematically documents the global crucible in which South Africa's current climate has been formed. Vale asserts that South Africa was nearly immune to pressure from the outside
for much of the cold war era, due to five factors: (1) the country's relative
prosperity with respect to an otherwise impoverished continent, predicated largely on the nation's mineral wealth, (2) a sophisticated industrial and technological base, (3) an articulated, staunchly anti-communist
ideology, (4) special ties to the United States, and (5) a safe distance from
international attention due to other global priorities. However, as the
country eventually learned, none of these factors could shield apartheid
indefinitely.
These historical observations, however, are only the tip of Vale's
iceberg of insight. His concluding observation is that South Africa is
about to confront a new, altogether different form of external pressure.
Ironically, it is a pressure to respond to economic opportunity and the
void in regional leadership. This stands in stark contrast to the recent
pressure to comply domestically with basic standards of human decency.
Vale laments that, regardless of how the issues concerning the transfer of power are resolved, sanctions will linger over South Africa for
some time to come. This is for two reasons. First, although the actual
sanctions themselves have been lifted, they have decimated the landscape
of the South African economy. Second, many sanctions "have developed
a life of their own,"4 5 the complexities of which may never be fully understood or remedied. Vale concedes, however, that sanctions may have
been both necessary and surprisingly effective at bringing apartheid to its
knees.

II.

TOWARDS

A POST-APARTHEID LEGAL ORDER

Despite its minor flaws, this project must be recognized as both a
significant contribution to the literature on the South African question,
as well as a potential tool for the drafting of a new constitution. To
understand how this project might inform decision makers, it may be
helpful to first consider exactly what the architects of the country's future might be working toward. Through this lens, a common theme that
runs throughout the book may be identified to inform the constitution
drafting process.
If there is one resource that South Africa has had in short supply
over the past decades, it is freedom. All South Africans, to varying degrees, have lacked the fundamental liberty to pursue ends unencumbered
by the resolve of a system of government to sustain itself. Black South
45 Id.
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Africans have been deprived of the most basic demands of human dignity. Ironically, even the most racist, right wing Afrikaner has been enslaved to her racism, her fears, and a government that monopolized the
mechanism of protection against the "Black threat." All of the castes in
between have similarly confronted the Faustian bargain of Malcolm X's
"house negro:"" toleration of, and even aspiration to second class citizenship and its concomitant "bread crumbs" may be an understandable
result of the realization that third class status is much worse.
With all South Africans deprived of some form of freedom, a constitution that guards this scarce commodity might be the first order of business. However, as many of the contributors to Towards a Post-Apartheid
Future have warned, protection of liberty may be furthest from the minds
of the soon to be empowered majority. Having been deprived of so many
things during the reign of apartheid, liberty may not be at the top of the
list of items to secure on Independence Day. Instead, economic control,
which was equally absent in the lives of Black South Africans, may be
the first thing seized, and possibly at the expense of all else. The leaders
of the new South Africa may find the temptation to capture and redistribute the wealth and resources of the ancien regime irresistible.
If the contributions to Towards a Post-ApartheidFuture agree on
one point, it is that control of tangible assets is transitory. White South
Africa built an empire on the hope that it could forever control the resources of this resource rich land. This empire now lies in ruins. Nationalization of resources was the means by which White South Africa
thought it could wrest control of South African society from both Black
South Africa and the leveling forces of the market. However, instead of
maintaining control of the pie, the Nationalists saw it shrink through
their fingers. The very same mistake can be made by a newly empowered
majority. The lesson is that if South Africans, rather than protect resources from one another, protected the freedoms of each other, the
value and wealth of resources might grow. This is exactly the point Ronald Bethlehem tries to make in his contribution.
Towards a Post-ApartheidFutureinforms the framers of the new democracy in South Africa that the protection of liberty, particularly economic liberty, is fundamental to any hope of future prosperity. A postapartheid constitution, therefore, should be especially fortified against
one thing, among others: The majority should avoid excessive state intervention in the economy, particularly in the form of "quick fix" redistribution or state ownership of resources. Centrally managed
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redistribution efforts would only temporarily skew resource allocation,
and defeat the market mechanisms equipped to accomplish more permanent equilibrium and effective wealth distribution. This lesson has been
learned by the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union, as well as by the outgoing National Party in South Africa.
The new leadership should note that, although the contributors to
this project represent the most disparate of ideological perspectives, even
the most Marxist of these authors shy away from advocacy of resource
redistribution. In short, Towards a Post-ApartheidFuture warns the people of South Africa that grabbing the "pie" will only leave all parties
equally hungry. The principled protection of liberty and property will,
however, effectuate a slower but more lasting wealth allocation that will
benefit all South Africans. While these safeguards do little to arrest the
racism and social division that will continue to plague the South African
people, such measures will help to ensure the resources necessary to provide basic human dignity, true equality and a higher standard of living
for all South Africans.
CONCLUSION

Towards a Post-ApartheidFuture may prove to be a useful tool in
the construction of a new constitution for South Africa, one perhaps
never before used for such a purpose. The book has value to the architects of freedom in South Africa in three primary dimensions. First, as
can be seen from the preceding discussion, its pages are a font of raw
material. Many of the questions decision makers might ask are answered
here. Both hard economic data and objective historical documentation
are drawn together from the most disparate sources. Second, the book
introduces even the most involved of freedom fighters to facets of the
situation of which he or she may be unaware, or with which he or she
might have little expertise. Finally, the contributions appear to converge
on a common warning for decision makers of the potential pitfalls that lie
ahead. The authors alert the people of South Africa to the idea that
resources do not promise freedom; rather, it is freedom that results in
more resources for all. In this way, the project removes the blinders with
which the struggle may have been successfully fought, and stimulates the
thought with which victory might be savored and not squandered.

